Fighting match-fixing: how good governance can stop the causes

Leigh Thompson discusses why good governance is the ultimate weapon in fighting match-fixing.

Whilst reading the recent press coverage concerning match-fixing I was reminded of a well-known phrase about the corrupting power of money: ‘Money makes good people do bad things’.

Indeed this phrase contains an important kernel of truth that is sometimes overlooked in the policy debate that surrounds match-fixing and integrity.

A lot of the focus around match-fixing, certainly in the media, tends to be on what might be termed the ‘law and order’ response.

This is principally about the types of measures that should be employed to detect corrupt betting activity and the sanctions, both disciplinary and criminal, that should apply to those guilty of fixing sports events. We can think of many recent scandals in cricket, football and snooker that have sparked highly emotive debate about how match-fixing is policed.

To be clear, this focus on regulatory and disciplinary measures is entirely understandable. Not only that, it is essential.

Without the robust detection and sanctioning regimes that have been put in place by sports bodies and government agencies in recent years it is almost certain sport would now be facing a far greater crisis of integrity.

As my colleague Patrick pointed out in his recent blog, match-fixing is an existential threat to sport and this is why the Alliance has been calling for match-fixing to be made a specific criminal offence.

Further, sports governing bodies have made significant efforts to educate players and officials around the rules regarding betting integrity and the consequences for failing to adhere to them. A good example is The FA’s current campaign in support of its ban on betting at all levels of the game.

However, despite these measures, the number of match-fixing incidents coming to light appears to be on the increase.

Part of this increase is likely to be a result of better detection – previously undetected fixes are now being identified.

However some of the increase will be unrelated to improved detection methods and that begs the question: if there are robust sanctions and appropriate education programmes in place, why would a player or official still take the risk?

Or, to rephrase the quote above, are there other, underlying conditions that might motivate good people (be they athletes or officials) to do bad things (fix matches)?

Part of the answer, I believe, lies in the role played by sports governing bodies and in particular the relationships sports governing bodies have with their clubs, athletes and officials.

In this regard the recent dispute over pay between Cameroon players and their own FA prior to the World Cup provides a useful illustration of how the conditions could be created in which match-fixing becomes an attractive – even logical – proposition.

Specifically where players and/or officials are paid late or infrequently (or not even paid at all) it is possible to see how the same players or officials may begin to consider alternative, more dubious ways of securing a regular income. After all, many athletes do not earn significant sums even at elite level and match-fixing is not confined to any particular type or level of sport.

In this context, where there are problems over an athlete’s pay or employment, a decision to match-fix may simply be reduced to a straightforward risk-reward trade off – one where the rewards outweigh the known risks.

Similarly, match-fixing may be more likely to take root where there is a lack of transparency and accountability in the way officials or administrators are appointed.

This can lead to a culture – or at least a perception – of corruption in which progression based on merit is supplanted by a system based on ‘favours’ and ‘kickbacks’.

Where these environments are allowed to flourish it is likely that officials and players will see match-fixing as simply an extension of other corrupt behaviour.

All of this serves to highlight the critical importance of good governance for sports governing bodies, something the Alliance has been leading on for a number of years.

In the context of match-fixing the key elements of good governance – transparency, accountability, integrity and sound financial management – must underpin the relationship between a governing body and its clubs, athletes and officials.

This means recognising the importance of athletes and officials as employees and being alert to the risks that can arise where transparency and accountability are lacking.

After all, if money makes good people do bad things it is often because doing something bad seems like the only rational choice.

In this way good governance can be a key weapon in the fight against match-fixing.

Ultimately, to borrow a phrase from a former Prime Minister, as a sector we need to be tough on match-fixing but also tough on the causes of match-fixing.

Read more Sport and Recreation Alliance blogs.

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